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Reputation-Based Decisions for Logic-Based Cognitive Agents
Isaac Pinyol · Jordi Sabater-Mir · Pilar Dellunde ·
Mario Paolucci
Abstract Computational trust and reputation models have been recognized as one of the key tech-
nologies required to design and implement agent systems. These models manage and aggregate the
information needed by agents to efficiently perform partner selection in uncertain situations. For sim-
ple applications, a game theoretical approach similar to that used in most models can suffice. How-
ever, if we want to undertake problems found in socially complex virtual societies, we need more so-
phisticated trust and reputation systems. In this context, reputation-based decisions that agents make
take on special relevance and can be as important as the reputation model itself. In this paper, we
propose a possible integration of a cognitive reputation model, Repage, into a cognitive BDI agent.
First, we specify a belief logic capable to capture the semantics of Repage information, which en-
codes probabilities. This logic is defined by means of a two first-order languages hierarchy, allowing
the specification of axioms as first-order theories. The belief logic integrates the information coming
from Repage in terms if image and reputation, and combines them, defining a typology of agents
depending of such combination. We use this logic to build a complete graded BDI model specified
as a multi-context system where beliefs, desires, intentions and plans interact among each other to
perform a BDI reasoning. We conclude the paper with an example and a related work section that
compares our approach with current state-of-the-art models.
1 Introduction
Computational trust and reputation models have been recognized as key to design and implementation
multi-agent systems [28]. These models manage and aggregate the information needed by agents to
efficiently select partners in uncertain situations. In recent years, several models have been developed
[40]. For simple applications, a game theoretical approach similar to that used in most models can
be sufficient. However, if we want to undertake problems found in socially complex virtual societies,
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2more sophisticated trust and reputation systems based on solid cognitive theories are needed. One
such cognitive theory is defined in [9].
The theory [9] proposes that agents evaluate the performances of other agents according to certain
criteria. These evaluations (social evaluations from now on) can be believed by the agents, commu-
nicated or both believed and communicated. According to [9] a social evaluation that is believed is
an image, while a social evaluation that circulates in the society, is reputation. Therefore, an agent
can have a good image of agent A as a seller, and at the same time acknowledge that A has a bad
reputation as a seller. Furthermore, at this level, the theory describes a typology of possible decisions
that autonomous agents can make involving social evaluations:
– Epistemic decisions cover the dynamics of beliefs regarding image and reputation, or in other
words, decisions about updating and generating social evaluations.
– Pragmatic-strategic decisions are decisions of how to behave with potential partners using social
evaluations information, and thus, how agents use these to reason.
– Memetic decisions refer to the decisions of how and when to spread social evaluations.
From a computational point of view, not all current state-of-the-art reputation models make a
distinction between image and reputation, but all of them compute social evaluations. In fact, the
field of reputation models has been mainly focused on epistemic decisions, while little attention has
been paid to pragmatic-strategic and memetic decisions. Indeed, agents’ decisions about how to use
reputation information and how and when to spread them have been designed ad-hoc lacking any
systematic or formal procedure. As mentioned before, this solution may suffice for simple environ-
ments, but in more complex societies pragmatic-strategic and memetic decision can be as important
as epistemic decisions, and need more formal approaches as well.
This paper focuses on pragmatic-strategic decisions. Here the Repage reputation model is chosen
as a paradigmatic example, because it is based on the cognitive theory defined in [9], to be integrated
in a BDI (Belief, Desire, Intention) agent, providing then a formal integration of social evaluations in
the agents’ reasoning and decisions. To do so, in section 2 we introduce the concepts of social evalu-
ation in the framework of the cognitive theory of reputation that we use in the paper, and how Repage
deals with these aspects. In section 3 we define the belief logic of the agents (LBC) as many-sorted
first-order logic to capture the semantics of Repage information, which embraces probabilities. We
use this logic in section 4 to ground Image and Reputation Repage predicates in terms of beliefs. We
highlight a typology of agents depending on the interaction between image and reputation. In section
5 we finally specify the complete BDI agent architecture as a multi-context system whose logical
reasoning process uses LBC. In section 6 we analyze some relevant reasoning points by presenting
an example. In section 7 we state the related work and compare some existing trust and reputation
models with our BDI+Repage system. Finally, in section 8 we conclude our analysis and propose the
future work.
2 Social Evaluations: Image and Reputation
If we want to define an agent architecture capable to capture the notions of reputation and use it in
a classical practical reasoning, we need first to get in touch with the view that Conte and Paolucci
introduced in [9]. This cognitive theory of reputation enhances what should be understood as reputa-
tion by contrasting it with a very related construct: image. According to this theory, both image and
reputation are social evaluations. Image though, is a simple evaluative believe that tells how good or
bad a given target results to be in a given context. Instead, reputation is a metabelief that acknowl-
edges the existence of an evaluation that circulates in the society. Thus, when A accepts that agent B
has a bad reputation as a car driver, A does not necessary believe such evaluation. It only believes
that B is reputed to be bad as a car driver.
In the following two subsections we get in touch with these two constructs as defined in [9],
providing a global vision of the constructs.
32.1 Image
As said before, image is an evaluative belief, a belief that describes an evaluation of a target, that can
be a single agent or supra-agent (like groups or institutions), towards a specific context. In fact, from
both [9] and [30] an image requires the context to be a goal that the agent wants to achieve. Hence,
an agent A evaluates another agent B when A thinks that B is good or bad for achieving the goal. We
will see how this constrain is relaxed when considering Repage [43], the computation model inspired
is this cognitive theory and the base for our work. For instance, in the most simplified scenario, an
agent can hold a very good image of John in the context of obtaining 2 boxes of high-quality wine.
The theory describes three sets of agents that participate in a given social evaluation as image[9]:
– Evaluators: A nonempty set of agents that share the evaluation. Hence, they must share the same
goal.
– Targets: A nonempty set of agents or supra-agents that are evaluated by the set of evaluators.
– Beneficiaries: A nonempty set of agents that use the evaluations, and thus, also share the same
goal.
Note that the sets of evaluators and beneficiaries do not necessary are the same. This is very clear
in online reputation mechanism, like eBay [12], where buyers evaluate sellers and these evaluations
are used by other buyers.
2.2 Reputation
The theory considers reputation as a belief about others’ evaluations. From a broad sense, it can
be considered a meta-belief. The theory analyses the roles of agents participating in a given social
evaluation as reputation [9]:
– Evaluators: A nonempty set of agents that share the evaluation. Hence, they must share the same
goal.
– Targets: A nonempty set of agents or supra-agents that are evaluated by the set of evaluators.
– Beneficiaries: A nonempty set of agents that use the evaluations, and thus, also share the same
goal.
– Third Parties: A nonempty set of agents that acknowledge that some evaluators share the eval-
uation.
The first three sets are the same as for image. Here though, the theory introduces a third party
agents group. This group shares the belief that a group of evaluators is endowed with the social
evaluation. Third parties are the holders of the reputation, and often they completely include the set
of evaluators. Third parties are those aware of the effects of reputation transmission and the ones that
transmit reputation (so called gossip).
2.3 Towards the Reputing Agent
From the individual perspective, agents can be partially aware of such sets and can in fact act in all
the roles1. We assume that our cognitive agent i is endowed with goals and beliefs and therefore is
able to generate evaluations about other agents. Thus, i acts as evaluator when performing epistemic
decisions. As well, i can act as beneficiary when receives evaluations from a set of agents S. In this
case, i knows that the agents in S act as evaluators. Also, when through memetic decisions i decided
1 This is not necessary always the case. We can think about agents societies whose members are buyers or sellers
(not both), and in which only buyers perform evaluations of sellers. In this case, the set of evaluators is the set of buyers,
and the set of targets, the set of sellers. In more generic situations though targets and evaluator can coincide
4to send its own evaluations to a set of agents D, i is aware that agents in D may act as beneficiaries,
and that they will know that i is an evaluator. Curiously, i may not be aware that she is actually
being targeted by others, but must be aware of such possibility and the consequences of achieving
bad evaluations. Because of that, cognitive agents have the motivation to act accordingly to well-
established social behaviors.
From the above conceptualization, the set of third-parties and the set of evaluators do not neces-
sary coincide. In fact, only designers of virtual societies could completely discriminate both sets. In
this paper, we focus on agents that can act both as evaluators and third-parties. We deal with an agent
architecture that is capable to evaluate and manage other agents’ behaviors (evaluator) and capable
as well to acknowledge reputation (third-party agent). From this point of view, we tackle situations
in which the set of evaluators is included in the set of third-parties.
From this perspective, when an individual agent accepts or acknowledges a given reputation it
indicates that the agent assumes that the nested evaluation circulates in the society, that most of the
members of the society (third-parties in this case) would acknowledge the existence of a circulating
voice about the target. In the same way than agents may share a given evaluation with others without
being aware of others existence [9], third-parties may share a given reputation (a meta-belief)
At the individual level, when a third party transmits reputation information about a given target
to a set of agents, it does not necessary believe the corresponding image of the target. This is because
reputation moves to a level above of image, the belief about the circulation of an evaluation.
In general, distributed reputation and trust models deal with agents only partially endowed with
the capabilities above. Instead, the Repage system [43] addresses them in a quite complete way,
since its theoretical framework comes from the cognitive theory of reputation defined in [9] that we
have defined briefly in the previous sections. Repage is designed to be part of agents architectures
as a system that computes image and reputation information (epistemic decisions), but does not tell
anything about how to use them in a practical reasoning process, which leads to pragmatic-strategic
decisions. As said before, the latter is the main topic of the paper. In the next section we explain how
Repage models social evaluations as image and reputation, detailing the information involved.
2.4 Social Evaluations in Repage
Social evaluations in Repage incorporate three elements: the target, the context, and the value of
the evaluation [35,43]. For instance, an evaluation may say that an agent A (target), as a car driver
(context or role) is very good (value). The original implementation of Repage maintains the value
associated to a social evaluation as a tuple of five positive values (summing to one), that we call
weights: [w1, . . . ,w5], defining a probabilistic distribution. Each value has an associated label in a
rating scale: Very Bad (VB), Bad (B), Neutral (N), Good (G) and Very Good (VG). The following
predicates capture the information that Repage generates in terms of Image and Reputation. Let i be
the evaluator agent that uses Repage, j a target agent, and r a context or role:
– Img( j,r, [w1,w2, . . . ]): Represents the image predicate that an agent (say i) has about j in the role
r. For instance,
Img( j,seller, [0.8,0.2,0,0,0])
indicates that the image that i has about j is VB (very bad) with a weight of 0.8 and B (bad)
with a weight of 0.2. Furthermore, the linguistic labels must be contextualized in each role.
For instance, in the role seller, VB may indicate that the quality of the obtained product after
interacting with j if below 20, and B that he quality goes from 20 to 40. Then, agent i may
know after interacting with j in the role seller, i will obtain a product of quality below 20 with
a probability of 0.8, and a product of quality between 20 and 40 with a probability of 0.2. To
compute such distribution Repage uses the history of interactions of i with j in the role seller,
and third-party image communications from other agents. Because of that, image predicates tend
5to indicate what the agent believe, even though this is not necessary true, because some agents
may combine such information with reputation predicates.
– Rep( j,r, [w1,w2, . . . ]): Represents a reputation predicate. The conceptualization of the predicate
is the same as for image. However, in this case Repage only uses communicated reputations to
compute the distribution. For instance,
Rep( j,seller, [0.8,0.2,0,0,0])
indicates that agent i knows that the reputation of j as a seller is VB (very bad) with a weight of
0.8 and B (bad) with a weight of 0.2. When the labels are contextualized and since Repage only
uses communicated reputations to compute them, this predicate indicates that i is aware that most
of the agents in the society say (in the sense of gossiping) that after interacting with j as a seller
one obtains a product of quality below 20 with a probability of 0.8, and a quality between 20 and
40 with a probability of 0.2.
As said before, Repage follows the idea that image and reputation are distinct objects, and offers
a complete specification on how such predicates are computed from communications and direct ex-
periences. Appendix A briefly shows the internals of Repage, although we refer to [43] for a detail
explanation. For this paper, this is detailed enough, since we face the problematic on how actually
agents use such predicates to reason.
2.5 Repage in logic-based agents
In this section we have explained what we understand for social evaluation and how the Repage
system captures them in terms of image and reputation predicates. Aforesaid, both concepts are
evaluative beliefs and therefore the information is part of the belief base of the agent. If we want logic-
based agents to use this information these higher-order predicates must be grounded to combine them
with other beliefs (not coming from the Repage system) and with the desires and intentions of the
agent. In the next section we define the belief logic that our BDI agent architecture uses to perform
logical reasoning over beliefs that model social evaluations coming from Repage, and beliefs that
model the general knowledge that the agent has gathered. The main characteristic of the logic is that
it can deal with several independent probabilistic distributions.
3 Defining the Belief Logic
In this section we describe the language LBC to express agents’ beliefs and to reason about them.
The language must be able to capture the semantics that Repage predicates bring over formulas.
Since a social evaluation in Repage describes a behavior of a target agent in a role as a probability
distribution, LBC must capture probabilities over some underlying language of the agents’ ontology.
Agents also need to perform basic epistemic inferences. In general, agents observe and interact
with the environment, incorporating knowledge to their respective bases. Obviously, we focus on
the knowledge that comes from Repage system, which provides evaluations in terms of probabilities
and that can be combined with other knowledge of the agent through logical inferences. This allows
the agents to combine such knowledge with their desires to finally generate intentions and act in
consequence to fulfill them. The idea is that LBC must capture all the knowledge that agents believe
at a given instant of time.
To define LBC we use the approach described in [20] where languages are structured as a hierar-
chy of first-order languages. A different approach that also uses hierarchies of first-order languages is
the one taken by [18], that could be alternatively used for our purposes. Both works suggest that first-
order logic is enough to define consistent theories of propositional attitudes for rational agents. In
6these papers, formulas ϕ from certain first-order language A can be embedded into another language
B as constants for the language, usually written as dϕe. For instance, we can have a language that
describes possible weather events in cities: Rain(Barcelona), Sunny(Rome)∧Sunny(Berlin), and an-
other language may talk about these events in terms of date/time: Forecast(10/11/2010,dRain(Barcelona)e).
3.1 Preliminaries: An Intuitive Idea
We want to illustrate with an example the kind of reasoning we are expecting from the logic of belief.
First, we recall that the Repage system provides probability distributions over the different roles that
an agent play. For example, in a scenario with buyers and sellers, a buyer i can decide to evaluate
sellers in two roles: The quality of the products they sell and the delivery time of the products:
Role Possible Outcomes
Seller(Quality) VeryGood Quality Good Quality Neutral Quality Bad Quality VeryBad Quality
Seller(dTime) dTime≤ 5 5< dTime≤ 10 10< dTime
Note that the possible outcomes for each role cover all the possibilities. How such information is
finally codified as beliefs is one of the contributions of this work and it is explained in detail. For the
example, it is enough to realize that part of the information that the agent manages comes from an
evaluation process that the Repage provides, while other comes from the general knowledge of the
agent. This is what justifies such integration.
In our model, the desires of our agent i lead the practical reasoning process. The main idea is that
for each desire, the belief logic should determine which actions allow the agent to achieve the desire
and with which probability. For instance, agent i can desire the following with a strength of 0.9
(D+(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5∧ payLess(500),0.9)
indicating that i desires to obtain a very good or good quality product delivered in less that 5
days and paying less than 500. Then, the logic of beliefs should provide which actions are capable to
produce it. In concrete we would like the system to provide beliefs like
B(buy(Bob),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5∧ paidLess(500),0.45) (1)
B(buy(Alice),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5∧ paidLess(500),0.8) (2)
B(buy(Charlie),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5∧ paidLess(500),0.4) (3)
For instance, (1) indicates that after executing the action buy(Bob), agent iwill obtain (VeryGood Quality∨
Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5∧ paidLess(500) with a probability of 0.45. The belief logic should de-
duce such information from more simple beliefs. For example, to deduce (1) agent i can hold the
following predicates:
B(buy(Bob),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality),0.9) (4)
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5,0.5) (5)
B(buy(Bob), paidLess(500),1) (6)
Our approach suggests that formulas like (4) and (5) are generated from Repage. Note that (4)
comes from the evaluation that agent i has about Bob in the role Seller(Quality), while (5) from
the evaluation of the same agent Bob in the role Seller(dTime). The key idea is that Repage gives a
probability distribution for each agent and role, and such probabilities can be combined under the
assumption that distributions are stochastically independent. Then, the system should be able to infer
from (4) and (5) the following:
B(buy(Bob),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5,0.45) (7)
7where the probability of 0.45= 0.9 ·0.5 is calculated following the standard probability computa-
tion for independent events. Also, the system should know that if a formula is always true (probability
1), like the case of (6) and it does not belong to any particular distribution, it can be combined using
conjunction, to finally generate (1). Also, the formula (6) should be calculated from the knowledge
that i has about how much it cost to buy at Bob. In this sense, it is feasible and reasonable to assume
that i should deduce (6) from:
B(buy(Bob), paid(350),1) (8)
B(ι , paid(350)→ paidLess(500),1) (9)
where ι stands for an empty action. The beliefs are able then to codify knowledge that always
holds after an action is executed (like formula (8)) and knowledge that always holds independently
from the action (like formula (9)). If we want to keep a uniform notation, both kind of formulas can
be codified with probability 1.
The previous example illustrates the kind of reasoning we are looking for and the properties of
the belief logic, which we enumerate:
(i) Evaluations from Repage codify the knowledge about the probabilities. This includes not only
the assignment of probabilities for each agent and role, but the correct construction of the probability
spaces. For instance, regarding Bob and role Seller(dTime) the following beliefs could be generated:
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5,0.5)
B(buy(Bob),5< dTime≤ 10,0.3)
B(buy(Bob),10< dTime,0.2)
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5∨dTime≤ 10,0.8)
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5∨10< dTime,0.7)
B(buy(Bob),5< dTime≤ 10∨dTime≤ 10,0.5)
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5∨5< dTime≤ 10∨dTime≤ 10,1)
(ii) Repage provides evaluations for each agent and role in terms of image and reputation, which
define two probabilistic distributions over the same agent an role that must be combined to finally
generate beliefs. To avoid inconsistencies, we introduce besides the belief predicate B two more
predicates, I (image) and S (reputation). Through the appropriate axioms we combine them to finally
generate beliefs that do not fall into inconsistencies.
(iii) When combining two formulas, in order to preserve a correct semantics and accuracy of
the probabilities, we only can ensure that the resulting probability is correct when such formulas
refer to the same action (so, the same agent) and talk about different roles, which we assume are
stochastically independent. For this we need to codify into the belief predicates also the roles that
are involved in the formula, and permit the combination of beliefs only when the intersection of such
set of roles is empty. For instance, following the above example, the beliefs should be codified in the
following way:
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5,0.5,{Seller(dTime)})
B(buy(Bob),5< dTime≤ 10,0.3,{Seller(dTime)})
B(buy(Bob),10< dTime,0.2,{Seller(dTime)})
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5∨dTime≤ 10,0.8,{Seller(dTime)})
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5∨10< dTime,0.7,{Seller(dTime)})
B(buy(Bob),5< dTime≤ 10∨dTime≤ 10,0.5,{Seller(dTime)})
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5∨5< dTime≤ 10∨dTime≤ 10,1,{Seller(dTime)})
Then the belief
B(buy(Bob),dTime≤ 5,0.5,{Seller(dTime)})
can be combined with
B(buy(Bob),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality),0.9,{Seller(Quality)})
8because the intersection of the respective set of roles is empty and the action is the same. The
resulting conjunction could be:
B(buy(Bob),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∧dTime≤ 5,0.45,{Seller(Quality),Seller(dTime)})
Note that we could also combine them with a disjunction. In this case,
B(buy(Bob),(VeryGood Quality∨Good Quality)∨dTime≤ 5,0.95,{Seller(Quality),Seller(dTime)})
where 0.95 = 0.9+ 0.5− 0.45 is calculated following standard probabilistic computations. The
important aspect is that in both cases the set of roles is the same, since it is an indication of the roles
that participate in the formula. This mechanism prevents the logic to combine formulas which are not
independent, so, that the intersection of their respective set of roles is not empty.
The following subsection formalizes the syntax and semantics of the belief logic.
3.2 LBC Syntax and Semantics
Following [20] we define two languages. The first one, denoted by Lbasic, is the object language.
Lbasic is a classical propositional language that contains the symbols needed by the agents for writing
statements about the application domain. The second language, denoted by LBC, is the language the
agents use to reason about beliefs, image and reputation. LBC is a first-order many-sorted language
that contains constant symbols for the formulas of the language Lbasic.
Following the example stated above, Lbasic could be composed of the set of elementary proposi-
tions that we use to describe the possible outcomes of each role: VeryGood Quality, Good Quality,
. . . ,, dTime≤ 5, 5< dTime≤ 10, . . . and the propositions Paid(X) and PaidLess(X) for each ratio-
nal number X . Then, the language is constructed with the standard syntax of propositional logic that
includes the symbols ¬, ∧, ∨ and→ necessary to express the base domain, as shown in the example.
LBC is a first-order many-sorted language and contains four sorts:
– SA: the sort representing actions.
– SF : the sort representing formulas of the language Lbasic.
– SR: the sort representing the power set of roles.
– SP: the sort representing probability values.
We use different letters for variables of different sorts of LBC:
– a,a1,a2, . . . for variables of sort SA
– x,x1,x2, . . . for variables of sort SF
– r,r1,r2, . . . for variables of sort SR
– p, p1, p2, . . . for variables of sort SP
Constants and predicate symbols of LBC are identified by their sorts. The sort SA includes a
finite set of constant symbols CA to denote actions. It also contains the constant ι to denote the
special empty action. The sort SF includes a set of constant symbolsCF to denote all formulas of the
language Lbasic. The set CF contains constants of the form dσe, where σ is a formula of Lbasic. The
sort SR includes a finite set of constant symbols CR to denote the roles, plus the set of subsets of CR.
Given a constant c ∈ SR we write E (c) to denote the set that represents the constant c, and given a set
of roles δ , we write E −1(δ ) to returns the set that is represented by the constant given as a parameter.
For the sake of clarity, we will write elements of this sort with the set that it represents. For instance,
if the constant k represents the set of roles
{seller(quality),seller(dTime)}
9, we will write the latter instead of k. Finally, the sort SP includes a set of constant symbols CP to
denote rational numbers in the unit interval [0,1]∩ IQ. For each p∈ [0,1]∩ IQwe introduce the constant
p in the sort. In general, for the sake of clarity, we omit the quote de˙ and the over line notation for
rational constants.
Now we specify the predicate symbols corresponding to various sorts. In the notation introduced
below, the predicate symbol B, for instance, is written B(SA,SF ,SR,SP). This means that B is a pred-
icate symbol of arity 4, with first argument in SA, second argument in SF , third argument in SR and
fourth argument in SP. The language LBC contains the following predicate symbols:
– Belief Predicate: B(SA,SF ,SP,SR).
– Image Predicate: E(SA,SF ,SP,SR).
– Reputation Predicate: S(SA,SF ,SP,SR).
The semantics of LBC is the usual for a first-order many-sorted language. In this section we have
presented only a few definitions and notation. A detailed introduction to the syntax and semantics of
first-order many-sorted logics can be found in [13].
LBC contains various symbols, in addition to the symbols of Lbasic, that allow us to deal with parts
of the agents’ formulas and to express the reasoning of the agents. The functions applied to the sort SF
are one unary function neg : SF → SF for the negation of formulas, and the binary functions con : SF×
SF → SF for conjunctions and imp : SF × SF → SF for implications. For instance, if dϕe,dφe ∈ SF
then imp(dϕe,dφe) represents the constant dϕ→ φe, con(dϕe,dφe) interprets dϕ∧φe, and neg(dφe)
interprets d¬φe. The expression or(x,y) stands for ¬(con(¬(x),¬(y))). Even when these functions
are purely syntactic transformations, it allows us to write sentences that talk about parts of the nested
formulas.
The key point is that the set of well-formed formulas of Lbasic is enumerable, and thus, it is possi-
ble to assign an id for each Lbasic formula that acts as a constant in LBC. Also, since this construction
only allow us to manage constants that point out to Lbasic elements, if in LBC we want to be able to
talk about parts of Lbasic formulas, we need to introduce a set of special functions neg, and and imp.
For instance, the term and(dϕe,dψe) is equal to the constant dϕ ∧ψe, but using the former, we can
access ϕ and ψ from LBC. This is not the case in the latter term, because de˙ is just an id, a constant
of the language LBC.
3.3 The Basic Axioms
In this section we define a theoryΓ over LBC, i.e. the axioms that agents use to reason. The theory con-
tains the minimal formulas to describe the behavior of the predicates introduced above. We assume
that the function product, sum and subtraction are defined for rational constants: ∗ : SP× SP → SP
where ∗ stands for ·,+ and − respectively.
RA: Conjunction
∀ax1x2p1p2r1r2(B(a,x1, p1,r1)∧B(a,x2, p2,r2)→ B(a,con(x1,x2), p1 · p2),r3)
when E (r1)∩E (r2) = /0 and r3 = E −1(E (r1)∪E (r2)). Intuitively, the axiom indicates that when two
formulas talk about independent distributions (so, disjoint set of roles) we can ensure that the joint
probability is the product.
MP: Modus ponens
∀ax1x2r(B(a,x1,1,r)∧Bi(a, imp(x1,x2),1,r)→ Bi(a,x2,1,r))
This indicates that agents use modus ponens. The axiom ensures the desirable equivalent axiom
K for modal logic. This is: B(a, imp(x1,x2),1,r)→ (B(a,x1,1,r)→ B(a,x2,1,r)).
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NE: Necessity axiom for actions
∀axr(B(ι ,x,1,r)→ B(a,x,1,r))
The axiom ensures that when the agent believes that a formula is true with a probability 1, after
whichever action is performed, the formula will be also true. This implies that formulas of the form
Bi(ι ,x,1,r) are theorems.
CO: Completeness of probability
∀axpr(B(a,x, p,r)→ B(a,neg(x),1− p),r)
This ensures that when an agent knows the probability of a formula, also knows its complemen-
tary. Note that when p1 = 1, the axiom is somehow equivalent to the D axiom of modal logic. This
is: B(a,x,1)→ B(a,neg(x),0). The axiom is also interesting because it states that a formula and its
complementary cover all the probabilistic space.
Moreover, note that given ac ∈FA, ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ SF ,Φ1,Φ2 ∈ SR and c1,c2 ∈ SP, when Bi(ac,ϕ1,c1,Φ1)
and Bi(a,ϕ2,c2,Φ2) hold, and E (Φ1)∩E (Φ2) = /0, and Φ3 = E −1(E (Φ1),E (Φ2)), the previous ax-
iomatization accomplishes the additive property of probabilistic spaces:
B(ac,con(ϕ1,ϕ2),d1,Φ3)∧B(ac,con(ϕ1,neg(ϕ2),Φ3),d2)→ Bi(a,ϕ1,d1+d2,Φ1)
(so, d1+ d2 = c1). Also, under the same condition the disjunction of independent formulas en-
sures the standard calculus of probabilities:
(B(ac,ϕ1,d1,Φ1)∧B(ac,y,d2,Φ2)∧B(ac,con(ϕ1,ϕ2),d3,Φ3)→ B(ac,or(ϕ1,ϕ2),d1+d2−d3),Φ3)
GBEL: Ground Beliefs
Bi(α1,ϕ1,1,e /0)
...
Bi(αn,ϕn,1,e /0)
Those are the beliefs that describe the general knowledge of the agent. Each αk is an action
(possibly also the empty action ι), and each ϕk is a proposition, a conjunction of propositions or a
rule of the form (ϕ1∧ϕm)→ ϕ from Lbasic. The probabilistic distributions are given by the predicates
E and S that will be introduced by the Repage system, which ensures that the distributions are correct.
To avoid inconsistencies we require that all the propositions are positive.
GI: Ground Images
Let ϕ1 . . .ϕn ∈ SF be proposition letters that completely define the space of a distribution (role)
R, the following formulas must be in the theory:
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E(α,dϕ1e,c1,{R})
E(α,dϕ2e,c2,{R})
...
E(α,dϕne,cn,{R})
E(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2e,c1+ r2,{R})
E(α,dϕ1∨ϕ3e,c1+ r3,{R})
...
E(α,dϕ2∨ϕ3e,c2+ c3,{R})
E(α,dϕ2∨ϕ4e,c1+ c4,{R})
...
E(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2∨ϕ3e,c1+ c2+ c3,{R})
E(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2∨ϕ4e,c1+ c2+ c4,{R})
...
E(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2∨ . . .ϕne,1,{R})
They describe the full probabilistic space with the constraint that the union of all the propositions
belonging to the distribution (or role) R covers the complete space. For the kind of reasoning we want
to perform, this is enough.
We remark that by assigning only the probabilities to each one of the basic propositions it is
possible to compute all the remaining ones. This is important because Repage gives us such proba-
bilities.
GR: Ground Reputations
They follow the same principle. Let ϕ1 . . .ϕn ∈ §F that are propositions that completely define
the space of a distribution P ∈ §P, the following formulas must be in the theory:
S(α,dϕ1e,c1,{R})
S(α,dϕ2e,c2,{R})
...
S(α,dϕne,cn,{R})
S(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2e,c1+ c2,{R})
S(α,dϕ1∨ϕ3e,c1+ c3,{R})
...
S(α,dϕ2∨ϕ3e,c2+ c3,{R})
S(α,dϕ2∨ϕ4e,c1+ c4,{R})
...
S(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2∨ϕ3e,c1+ c2+ c3,{R})
S(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2∨ϕ4e,c1+ c2+ c4,{R})
...
S(α,dϕ1∨ϕ2∨ . . .ϕne,1,{R})
IRB: Image-Reputation-Belief
Finally, this axiom (or set of axioms) combine E and S predicates over the same action, formula
and distribution to generate beliefs. Depending of how we define the axioms, we can model different
kind of agents. The most general case is:
∀axp1p2r(E(a,x, p1,r)∧S(a,x, p2,r))→ B(a,x,h(p1, p2),r)
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where h : [0,1]∩ IQ× [0,1]∩ IQ→ [0,1]∩ IQ is a function that combines the probabilities and pre-
serves the probability distribution properties, for instance, the average, or weighted average to give
more importance to image or reputation information. Next section discusses it in more detail.
Equality Predicate If the binary predicate equality (=) for terms wants to be included in the
logic, several extra axioms must be also defined. In this case, for all ϕ,φ ∈CF
neg(dϕe) = d¬ϕe
imp(dϕe,dφe) = dϕ → φe
con(dϕe,dφe) = dϕ ∧φe
3.4 The Basic Semantics
In this subsection we show that the set of axioms presented above defines a first-order theory (say
Γ ) that is consistent. We do it by showing that the theory has, at least, a model that contains a set
of positive atoms that exist in the model. Such model represents the reasoning process that the agent
follows to deduce belief predicates. Following a similar approach than [20], we consider only models
that contain ground terms of the language, so, Herbrand models.
Proposition 1 The theory Γ has a minimal modelM for any underlying language Lbasic.
Proof To proof it, we constructM by induction following a stratification construction of the model.
The main idea is to add the minimal number of atoms that accomplish the axioms, starting from
the atoms that must be present in all the models, i.e. GBEL (ground beliefs), GI (ground images),
GR (ground reputation) and the equality predicates for terms and rational numbers, and continuing by
induction. Like in the construction of models used for logical programming, the strata k (k≥ 1) of the
model includes all the generated atoms that require the application of at least k axioms to be created.
Thus, the ground atoms generated from the axioms GBEL, GI, GR and equality predicates are in the
first strata, and belong to the modelM (note that they are all positive), becoming the starting point of
the construction. In the induction step we assume thatM already contains the atoms until the strata
k. The generation of the strata k+1 is done by applying any relevant axiom to the atoms already in
M .
The application of axioms in the induction step implies to add the minimal number of atoms to
satisfy each axiom. We do not show the details on how each axiom creates add new atoms. However,
we illustrate it with the axiom RA (conjunction). Let us assume that the following ground atoms are
already in the model.
B(buy( john),VeryGood Quality,0.9,{seller(quality)})
B(buy( john),dTime≤ 5,0.5,{seller(dtime)})
Then, to preserve the consistency of the model, the axiom RA is applied, and then, the following
atom must be included into the model:
B(buy( john),VeryGood Quality∧dTime,0.45,{seller(quality),seller(dTime))}
Under the assumption that GI and GR are well-constructed, so, they define correct probabilistic
distributions, and that all GBEL axioms contain positive propositions, the construction of the model
can be done for any underlying Lbasic without falling into inconsistencies. 
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Given ground beliefs (GBEL), ground images (GI) and ground reputations (GR), the construction
of the modelM gives us the belief formulas that the agent holds. Note that one and only one model
exists, because all the axioms are universally quantified and do not contain disjunctions.
Also, note that under the assumption that GI and GR define correct probabilistic distributions,
the axiomatization model the behavior of probability spaces for each role, and the combination of
them when they are independent (different roles are involved). This is what the axiom IRB (image-
reputation-belief) ensures.
3.5 Related Work
Some current state-of-the-art logics inspired us for defining the logic. The probabilistic and dynamic
notions have been mostly treated in epistemic logic ([25], [14]), and in a simpler way in belief logic
[6]. Propositional probabilistic variants of dynamic logic have been studied with the goal of analyzing
probabilistic programs (for instance [26]).
Furthermore, some formalizations of trust using belief logic have been done [27], where trust is
related to information acquisition in multi-agent systems, but in a crisp way. Similar to this, in [11],
modal logic is used to formalize trust in information sources, also with crisp predicates. Here, actions
and communicated formulas are also used.
Regarding fuzzy reasoning on trust issues, in [15] it is defined a trust management system in
a many-valued logic framework where beliefs are graded. Also, in [10] it is proposed a logic that
integrates reasoning about graded trust (on information sources) and belief fusion in multi-agent
systems. Our logic does not use graded beliefs. Instead, we use the notion of beliefs on probability
sentences, since as we stated in Section 2, Repage social evaluations describe probabilities on the
outcomes of future direct experiences.
Finally, in [36] a probabilistic dynamic belief logic is defined for dealing also with image and
reputation notions. In this logic, beliefs and actions are considered normal modalities while probabil-
ity predicates are considered non-standard modalities. Even though this logic can be more expressive
than the BC-logic (it allows nested beliefs and probability formulas), there is no soundness and com-
pleteness demonstration and it remains in a very theoretical dimension.
We could have extended any of the previous logics to fulfill our original necessities. However,
we wanted a very flexible logical framework not tied to any specific semantics and with a very clear
orientation towards possible implementation. Even when first-order logic is semi-decidable and it is
not possible to guarantee very low complexities, it is indisputable that restricting the logic to first-
order horn clauses together with other minimal assumptions, would ensure an easy adaptation to logic
programming platforms.
As mention earlier, the construction we propose serves to model bounded agents. Other ap-
proaches use similar ideas to treat syntactically modal operators, like [18] and all the work done
using the idea of multi-context systems, for instance [32,6], the idea is to rely on first-order logics,
having a clear inclination to implementable systems that take advantage of logical inferences.
4 Grounding Image and Reputation to LBC
In this section we show how LBC is capable to capture image and reputation predicates from Repage,
and how such information is transform into the beliefs of the agent. When this inference is performed,
the knowledge base of the agent is ready to be combined with the other parts of the whole agent’s
architecture, explained in detail in the following section.
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4.1 Image and Reputation Predicates
As explained in section 2, image and reputation predicates computed from Repage are captured by
the following expressions
– Img( j,r, [Vw1 , . . . ,Vwm ])
– Rep( j,r, [Vw1 , . . . ,Vwm ])
corresponding to the Image and Reputation of agent j playing the role r, from the point of view of
i. We mention that the original implementation of Repage considers a tuple of 5 elements to represent
the value of the evaluations. However, we generalize it, considering m (m ≥ 2) elements. When in
Repage the role and its labeled weights are defined, the role uniquely identifies an interaction model
with two participants (i and j), and each wk identifies a predicate, a formula from Lbasic. To simplify,
we can assume that the interaction model identified by a role is summarized in a single action2. Thus,
we presuppose the definition of a mapping Rr,i between a given role r and agent i to an action. In
a similar way, we assume a mapping Tr,wk between each role r and label wk to a formula written in
Lbasic.
We illustrate this with an example: In a typical market, the transaction of buying a certain product
involves two agents, one playing the role of buyer (i) and the other playing the role of seller ( j). From
the point of view of the buyer, if she wants to evaluate other agents that play the role of seller, she
knows that the associated action is buy at agent j. So, Rseller, j maps to buy( j). In the same way,
the agent must know the meaning of each label wk of Repage. Then, we can define that Tseller,w1 is
veryBadProduct, Tseller,w2 is okProduct, etc.
In this mapping, the Repage predicate Imgi( j,seller, [0.2, 0.3, . . . ]) indicates that agent i believes
that there is a probability of 0.2 that after executing the action Rseller, j (corresponding to the action
buy( j)), she will obtain aTseller,w1(veryBadProduct); with 0.3 that she will obtainTseller,w2(OKproduct),
etc. With reputation predicates the structure is similar, but the concept is quite different. In this case
it indicates that agent ic believes that the corresponding evaluation is said by the agents in the group.
Following these indications, the representation of both predicates in LBC is quite simple. Let i, j
be agent identifiers and r a role, then
Img( j,r, [Vw1 ,Vw2 , . . . ])
E(Rr j,Tr,w1 ,Vw1 ,{r})
E(Rr j,Tr,w2 ,Vw2 ,{r})
. . .
Rep( j,r, [Vw1 ,Vw2 , . . . ])
S(Rr j,Tr,w1 ,Vw1 ,{r})
S(Rr j,Tr,w2 ,Vw2 ,{r})
. . .
Repage ensures a correct probabilistic information in terms of a probabilistic distribution, and
from these assignments it is easy to calculate the remaining disjunction probabilities necessary for
the logical theory.
As a matter of example and following the scenario above, let j1, j2 be agents, if Repage has
generated the following predicates:
Img( j1,seller, [.1, .1, .1, .2, .5])
Rep( j2,seller, [.6, .1, .1, .1, .1])
The logical theory should include regarding j1
2 An interaction model can be seen as a set of actions to be performed by the agents.
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E(buy( j1),VBadProduct,0.1,{seller})
E(buy( j1),BadProduct,0.1, ,{seller})
E(buy( j1),OKProduct,0.1, ,{seller})
E(buy( j1),GoodProduct,0.2, ,{seller})
E(buy( j1),BadProduct,0.5, ,{seller})
And regarding j2:
S(buy( j2),VBadProduct,0.6,{seller})
S(buy( j2),BadProduct,0.1,{seller})
S(buy( j2),OKProduct,0.1,{seller})
S(buy( j2),GoodProduct,0.1,{seller})
S(buy( j2),BadProduct,0.1,{seller})
4.2 Relationship between Image and Reputation
One of the key points of Repage and the cognitive theory of reputation that underlies it [9] is the rela-
tionship between image and reputation. The theory states that both are social evaluations but distinct
objects. With the representation we give for image and reputation in the LBC and the axiomatization
(the theory Gamma), the difference depends on the relationship between the predicate E and the
predicate S.
Regarding the key question: How does reputation influence image? can be reformulated in terms
of BC-logic as How does what is communicated influence what is believed? Conte and Paolucci in
[9] state that the relation is mostly established at the pragmatic-strategic level of the agent. At this
level, agents must decide which source of information to use. Typically, reputation information is
used only if image information is not present, but from this perspective, reputation cannot influence
the inner beliefs of the agent. However, from a logical perspective, this relationship seems closer and
is defined by the axiom IRB (Image-Reputation-Belief):
∀axp1p2r(E(a,x, p1,r)∧S(a,x, p2,r))→ B(a,x,h(p1, p2),r)
Different functions h : [0,1]∩IQ× [0,1]∩IQ→ [0,1]∩IQmodel different behaviors. We only require
that h preserves the probability distribution properties. Some elaborated aggregation functions can be
found in [42], but basically, they are based on weighted averages. Thus, a family of functions is
determined by the expression:
h(pE , pS) =
δE · pE +δS · pS
δE +δS
where δE ,δS ∈ IQ≥. Table 1 summarizes the behavior of a family of agents depending on the
values of δE and δS. Note that h can be defined globally, as it is in the axiomatization, but we can
have different functions for different distributions (roles). For instance, following the example above,
∀axp1p2 (E(a,x, p1,{Seller(Quality)})∧
S(a,x, p2,{Seller(Quality)})) → B(a,x,hq(p1, p2),{Seller(Quality)})
∀axp1p2 (E(a,x, p2,{Seller(dTime)})∧
S(a,x, p2,{Seller(dTime)})) → B(a,x,ht(p1, p2),{Seller(dTime)})
where hq ∈H2 and ht ∈H4 (see table 1 for a description ofH2 andH4. This indicates that agent
i does not trust its own experiences regarding the quality of the product and relies on reputation. In-
stead, regarding the delivery time the agent gives more importance to its own direct experiences.
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Class Condition Description
H1 δE 6= 0, δS = 0 Only image - The agent does not trust in reputation information
H2 δE 6= 0, δS = 0 Only reputation - The agent does not trust in image information
H3 δE = δS 6= 0 The agent considers that both sources of information have the same importance
H4 δE > δS Image is more important than reputation
H5 δE < δS Reputation is more important than image
Table 1 Different h function classes when it is based on a weighted average: h(pE , pS) = δE ·pE+δD ·pSδE+δS
This configuration can look estrange, but let us consider for instance, an agent that is aware of its
limitations regarding certain skill, or a robot agent that is aware that its sensors do not work well. In
general, to establish this function on design time is quite difficult, because it requires precise knowl-
edge of the society. Ideally, one can design metareasoning processes to establish the best function
when the system is running in a real scenario. In fact, simple q-learning techniques suffices to some
extend for this purpose [34].
5 Integrating Repage in a Multi-Context BDI Agent
In the previous sections we have defined the language LBC and a theory written in that langiage
that expresses that expresses the reasoning process of the agent. We have also shown how the the-
ory captures the semantics of image and reputation predicates coming from Repage, and how such
information is combined to finally generate beliefs.
In this section, we propose a possible integration of Repage in a BDI agent3. The underlying idea
is to define a BDI agent, specified as a multi-context system, that uses the logic presented in Section 3
to describe the belief base of the agent. Then, such information would be combined with the desires
of the agent and other functional components to generate intentions, which in turn would end up
generating proper actions. In the first part of the section, we briefly introduce the notion of multi-
context system and some of the related work regarding existent multi-context BDI specifications. The
second part relies on the explanation of each element that compounds our BDI+Repage architecture.
5.1 Multi-context Systems
Multi-context systems (MCS) provide a framework to allow several distinct theoretical components
to be specified together, with a mechanism to relate these components [18]. These systems are com-
posed of a set of contexts (or units), and a set of bridge rules. Each context can be seen as a logic and
a set of formulas written in that logic. Bridge rules are the mechanisms to infer information from one
context to another.
Giunchiglia and Serafini [18] proposed the following formalization of MCS: Let I be the set of
context names, a MCS is formalized as 〈{Ci}i∈I ,4br〉:
– Ci = 〈Li,Ai,4i〉, where Li is a formal language with its syntax and semantics, Ai is a set of axioms
and 4i the set of inference rules. Thus, Li and Ai define an axiomatic formal system, a logic for
the context Ci. Beside axioms, it is possible to include a theory Ti as predefined knowledge. All
Ai,4i and Ti are written in the language Li.
– 4br is a set of bridge rules.
Bridge rules can be seen as inference rules among contexts. Each one has a set of antecedents (or
preconditions) and a consequent (or postcondition). Then, when each formula in the antecedent is
true in its respective context, the consequent becomes true as well (also in its context). A bridge rule
is represented as follows:
3 A preliminary version of the model described in this section was originally published at [33].
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Ci1 : ϕ1, . . . ,Cin : ϕn
Cix : ϕx
where Cik : ϕk indicates that formula ϕk belongs to the context Cik , formulas ϕ1 . . .ϕn are the an-
tecedents and ϕx is the consequent. Each ϕi is a formula that belongs to its respective context, and
written in its own language. So, when the formulas ϕ1, . . .ϕn hold in their contexts, the formula ϕx is
generated in the contextCix . However, we extend this approach by allowing in preconditions, compar-
isons between rational numbers. For this, the antecedent may include a set Q1, . . . ,Qn (where n≥ 0)
of extra conditions that must be evaluated as true to make the bridge rule applicable. Each Qi has
the form r1 ≤ r2 where r1,r2 ∈ IQ and ≤ corresponds to the standard boolean comparison on rational
numbers.
5.2 MCS and BDI Agents
The use of MCS offers several advantages when specifying and modeling agent architectures [44].
From a software engineering perspective, MCS supports modular architectures and encapsulation.
From a logical modeling perspective, it allows the construction of agents with different and well-
defined logics, keeping all formulas of the same logic in their corresponding context. This increases
considerably the representation power of logical agents, and at the same time, simplifies their con-
ceptualization.
Also, the use of MCS to specify BDI is not new. The BDI architecture defined in [32] uses one
context for each attitude; there is the belief context (B), the desire context (D) and the intention
context (I). Each of them is equipped with a logic that corresponds to the premises that Rao and
Georgeff [37] stated. Bridge rules among contexts determine the relationship between the attitudes
and the type of agent: strong realism, realism and weak realism [37]. A communication context (C)
is also included.
In [17], this specification is extended by means of a new commitment context, equipped with a
deontic logic, creating then a new attitude of obligation. In [6] a multi-context BDI agent is specified
and its attitudes are graded. Therefore, beliefs, desires and intentions are multi-valued with grades
from 0 to 1. For our BDI model, we take the logic defined for desires and intentions described in [6]
and [7].
5.3 The Multi-context BDI Model
The specification of our BDI agent as a multi-context system is formalized with the tuple Ag= 〈{BC,
DC, IC, PC,CC, RC},4br〉. These correspond to Belief, Desire, Intention, Planner, Communication
and Repage contexts respectively. The set of bridge rules4br incorporates the rules 1,2,3,4,P,Q and
B (shown in Figure 3) and the bridge rules AI and AR (shown in Figure 2). Figure 1 shows a graphical
representation of this multi-context specification. In the next sections we briefly explain each context
and bridge rule.
5.3.1 Belief Context (BC)
This context contains the beliefs of the agent. Hence, we use the logic introduced in Section 3, to
integrate the knowledge coming from the reputation model Repage and other knowledge gathered by
the agent. Since LBC is a many-sorted first-order logic, the inference rules in this context are those
from first-order logic. Thus, BC-context becomes an inference system that incorporate the theory
defined in section 3. Notice that this how we have constructed the model for the the theory.
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Fig. 1 The Repage context embedded in a multi-context BDI agent. Circles represent context and arrows represent
bridge rules.
5.3.2 Desire context (DC)
This context deals with the desires of the agent. Like the BDI model described by Rao and Georgeff
in [37], they are attitudes that are explicitly represented and that reflect the general objectives of
the agent. We consider that desires are graded, and for that, we use the multi-valued logic (DC-
logic) based on the Lukasiewicz logic described in [5]. The motivation for this decision arises when
considering that reputation information has already a graded nature. In our case, represented as prob-
abilities. Like in decision theory where agents manage expected utilities, we consider that from one
side we an achieve the probabilities, and from the other the strength of the desires. Combining them,
we implement the idea of expected utility.
DC-language is built as an extension of a propositional language (in our case we must Lbasic), by
adding two fuzzy modal operators: D+ and D−. The intended meaning of D+ϕ is that the formula ϕ
is desired by the agent holding it, and its truth degree, from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum), represents
the level of satisfaction if ϕ holds. The intended meaning of D−ϕ is that ϕ is negatively desired, and
the truth degree represents the level of disgust if ϕ holds. Also, DC-logic includes truth constants
r where r ∈ [0,1]⋂ IQ, and the connectives & and ⇒ corresponding to the Lukasiewicz conjunction
and implication respectively. In our architecture, agents’ preferences are expressed by a set of desire
expressions (both positive and negative) defining a theory.
We differentiate generic from concrete desires. Generic desires define the general preferences of
the agent, and are formulas like D∗φ , where ∗ stands from + or− and φ does not contain any action.
Concrete desires are formulas like D∗αφ and define the desire to satisfy φ by executing action α . The
original DC-logic from [5] does not consider subindex for the actions. However it uses this notation
for the intentions (see next subsection). With this we indicate that a concrete desire takes into account
the action to achieve the content. In this case, the grade represents the expected satisfaction level (or
disgust if it is a negative desire) if the action is executed, implementing an equivalent expected utility
from decision theory. Also, it serves to indicate that in the framework, actions do not behave as in
dynamic logic. In our model, concrete desires are generated from generic desires and beliefs through
bridge rules 1 and 2 (see section 5.4.2).
Because in Lukasiewicz logic the formula φ ⇒ ϕ is 1-true iff the truth value of ϕ is greater or
equal to that of φ , and the truth value of r is exactly r, formulas like r⇒ D+i ϕ in the theory of an
agent indicate that the level of satisfaction of agent i is at least r if ϕ holds. The same with negative
desires and the level of disgust. From now on we will write these formulas as (D+i ϕ,r) and (D
−
i ϕ,r).
The semantics is given in terms of a positive and negative preference distributions over the possible
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AI :
RC : Img( j,r, [Vw1 ,Vw2 , . . . ])
BC : E(Rr j,Tr,w1 ,Vw1 ,{r})
BC : E(Rr j,Tr,w2 ,Vw2 ,{r})
. . .
AR:
RC : Rep( j,r, [Vw1 ,Vw2 , . . . ])
BC : S(Rr j,Tr,w1 ,Vw1 ,{r})
BC : S(Rr j,Tr,w2 ,Vw2 ,{r})
. . .
Fig. 2 The bridge rules AI and AR (see Figure 1). They translate Image and Reputation predicates respectively into the
belief context.
worlds. The axiomatization includes the classical logic axiom of propositional logic for non-modal
formulas, plus the axioms of Lukasiewicz [21]. It is important to remark that the author defines
the semantic condition that a world that is negatively desired to some extend cannot be positively
desired. In terms of the axiomatization, this implies that the same formula cannot be both negatively
and positively desired. We refer to [5] for technical details and proof of completeness of the logic.
5.3.3 Intention Context (IC)
This context describes the intentions of the agent. Like in the Rao and Georgeff’s BDI model [37],
intentions are explicitly represented, but in our case generated from beliefs and desires. Also, we
consider that intentions are graded, and for this we use the IC-logic defined in [6].
Similar to DC-logic, IC-logic is built from a propositional language (in our case, the Lbasic )
defining a fuzzy modal operator to express formulas like Iαϕ . It indicates that the agent has the
intention to achieve ϕ through the action α , and its truth degree (from 0 to 1) represents a measure
of the trade-off between the benefit and counter-effects of achieving ϕ through α . Moreover, IC-logic
is defined in terms of a Lukasiewicz logic in the same way as DC-logic. Also, formulas like r⇒ Iiϕ
will be written as (Iiϕ,r). For the technical details and the proof of completeness we refer to [5].
Our system generates intentions through the bridge rule 3, from a positive concrete desire and
the set of negative desires that may be achieved through the same action.
5.3.4 Planner Context (PC) and Communication Context (CC):
The logic in the Planner context is a first-order logic restricted to Horn clauses. In this first approach,
this context only holds the special predicate action, which defines a primitive action together with its
precondition. We look forward to introducing plans as a set of actions in the future. Communication
context is a functional context as well, and its logic is also a first-order logic restricted to Horn clauses
with the special predicates does to perform actions, and rec jϕ to indicate that the agent has received
the communication ϕ from agent j.
5.3.5 Repage context (RC)
The Repage context contains the Repage model. It is a functional context and we capture the informa-
tion that the model computes with the predicates Img( jc,r, [Vw1 ,Vw2 ,. . . ]) and Rep( j,r, [Vw1 ,Vw2 ,. . . ]),
corresponding to the Image and Reputation of agent jc playing the role r. See section 4 for a detailed
analysis.
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1:
DC : (D+ϕ,dϕ )
BC : B(α,ϕ, pψ ,Q)
DC : (D+αϕ,g(dϕ , pψ ))
2:
DC : (D−ϕ,dϕ )
BC : B(α,ϕ, pψ ,Q)
DC : (D−αϕ,g(dϕ , pψ ))
3:
DC : (D+αϕ,δ ),PC : action(α,P),PC : P
DC : (D−αψ1,δψ1 ), . . . ,(D
−
αψn,δψn )
δ −∑nk=1 δψk ≥ 0
IC : (Iαϕ, f (δ ,∑nk=1 δψk ))
4: IC : (Iαϕ,εmax)CC : does(α)
P,Q ,B:
BC : Bϕ
PC : ϕ ,
BC : Bϕ
RC : ϕ ,
CC : reci jϕ
RC : reci jϕ
Fig. 3 The bridge rules 1, 2, 3, 4, P, Q and B (see Figure 1).
5.4 Bridge Rules
5.4.1 Bridge Rules AI and AR
Bridge rules AI and AR (see Figure 2) are in charge of generating the corresponding E and S predi-
cates from images and reputations respectively, as explained in section 4. The key idea in this inter-
face is that if the image or reputation information changes in Repage, the previously generated E and
S predicates will not have the support to be valid any more, and thus, they must be out withdrawn
from the theory (together with all the inferences performed so far from these predicates), placing
the new ones instead. In this way, the theory is always consistent with the information that Repage
computes.
5.4.2 Bridge Rules 1, 2, 3, 4
Bridge rules 1 and 2 (see Figure 3) transform generic desires to more concrete and realistic desires.
To do this, these bridge rules merge generic desires from DC (with absolute values of satisfaction or
disgust) with the information contained in BC, which includes the probability to achieve the desire
by executing certain action. The result is a desire whose gradation has changed, becoming more
realistic. This is calculated by the function g. If we define it as the product of both values, we obtain
an expected level of satisfaction/disgust4.
Bridge rule 3 generates intentions. It takes into account both the expected level of satisfaction and
the cost of the action. At the same time, executing an action to achieve certain formula can generate
undesirable counter-effects. Thus, bridge rule 3 also takes into account the possible negative desires
that can be reached by executing this action. In this bridge rule, for each positive realistic desire (D+),
we must include all negative desires (D−) that can result from the same action. In this way we have
the value of the positive desire (δ+) and the sum of all negative desires (δ−) that can be achieved
by executing the same action. The strength of the intention that is created is defined by a function
f . Different f functions would model different behaviors. In our examples we use the following
definition: f (δ+,δ−) = max(0,δ+−δ−).
4 When g is defined as the product, the outcome is very similar to the notion of expected utility used in decision
theory.
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Finally, bridge rule 4 instantiates a unique intention (the one with maximum degree) and gener-
ates the corresponding action in the communication context.
5.4.3 Bridge Rules P,Q and B
Bridge rules P and Q allow the planner and Repage context respectively to be aware of the beliefs of
the agent. The planner context uses this information to build plans, actions and their preconditions.
Repage uses the information to configure the mappingsR and T .
Rule B reflects the reaction of the communication context once it receives communicated im-
ages, communicated reputation, third party images from other agents and fulfillment predicates. The
content of these communications is directly introduced in Repage, which will update its information.
6 Putting the Model to Work
In this section we analyze the reasoning processes performed by an executable version of the model
presenting an example.
The base scenario we use involves a BDI agent (i) that, as a manager of a small restaurant, needs
to periodically order wine to refill the stock. In this scenario, several providers are available. The
information our agent wants to capture about them includes reliable information, for instance the
price she will have to pay, but also uncertain information such as the delivery time of the orders and
the quality of the wine. While reliable information is introduced as beliefs of probability 1, uncertain
information will result in beliefs of lower probability values.
This situation can be formalized in multiple ways. We can define four possible pairwise disjoint
predicates for the quality of the wine: poorWine, averageWine, goodWine, excellentWine (pW , aW ,
gW and eW from now on) and five pairwise disjoint predicates for the delivery time: days(0,1),
days(2,3), days(4,5), days(6,10), days(11,∞) indicating respectively a delivery time up to 1 day,
between 2 and 3 days etc. Also we define the predicates paid(X), paidLess(X), paidMore(X) to indi-
cate that the agent has paid X , less than X and more than X respectively,and the implication relation
paid(X)→ paidLess(Y ) when X < Y , and paid(X)→ paidMore(Y ) when X > Y . The predicate
budget(X) indicates that the money she has in the budget is X . This knowledge and the implication
among predicates must be introduced also as beliefs.
The interaction model defining the purchase of wine indicates that providers act as wineSellers,
but agent i wants to evaluate them in the two independent dimensions: the quality of the wine and the
delivery time. Thus, Repage uses the roleswineSeller(quality) andwineSeller(dTime). The mapping
R (see section 4.1) of these two roles points to the same action buyWine (buy from now on), which
then summarizes the entire interaction model. The mappingT of the role wineSeller(quality) relates
w1 to poorWine, w2 to averageWine etc, and the mapping T of the role wineSeller(dTime) relates
w1 with days(0,1), w2 with days (2,3), etc.
6.1 The Initial Knowledge
In this world, our agent knows the existence of four providers represented by alice, bob, charlie and
debra respectively. Our agent is aware of their prices, and so this knowledge is introduced as beliefs:
B(buy(alice),hasWine∧ paid(1000),1,e /0)
B(buy(bob),hasWine∧ paid(900),1,e /0)
B(buy(charlie),hasWine∧ paid(400),1,e /0)
B(buy(debra),hasWine∧ paid(1300),1,e /0)
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Bridge rule P introduces the information above into the planner context in order to generate the
corresponding plans (simple actions in this case). It follows then, that in PC we find
action(buy(alice),hasMoreMoney(1000))
indicating that the action of buying wine from alice is preconditioned on the budget having more
than 1000.
6.2 Study cases
6.2.1 Exploring the space: case 1
Our agent is new to the business and only trusts her own direct experiences. It means that axiom IRB
uses a function h of the classH1. Since she is just starting the business, she is mostly concerned about
the quality of the wine rather than the delivery time. She has a budget of 1350 (budget(1350)) for
the purchase. Regarding her desires, she would be satisfied with paying up to 1350 for an excellent
wine. With the same strength she would be satisfied paying up to 800 for a good wine. In any case,
she needs the wine. What she does not want is a poor or average wine. Lower on her priority list
is obtaining the wine quickly, but still a long delivery time is not desired. These preferences can be
formalized as desires in the DC as follows:
(D+(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), .9)
(D+(hasWine∧ paidLess(800)∧gW ), .9)
(D+hasWine, .7)
(D−pW,1)
(D−aW, .8)
(D−days(11,∞), .5)
(D−days(6,10), .4)
Since she does not have any information about the providers, Repage predicates contain the maximum
possible uncertainty. For instance, the corresponding image predicates for charlie are:
Img(charlie,wineSeller(quality), [.25, .25, .25, .25])
Img(charlie,wineSeller(time), [.2, .2, .2, .2, .2])
Under these conditions the reasoning process leads to a random choice between three agents (charlie,bob
and alice) to achieve the desire hasWine. In the following lines we briefly explain the most relevant
steps.
Bridge rule AI generates beliefs in the BC from images. As said before, the epistemic decision is
not done at this rule but inside Repage, which computes image and reputation. In the case of charlie
this rule is activated regarding the role wineSeller(quality) as:
RC : Img(charlie,wineSeller(quality), [.25, .25, .25, .25])
BC : E(buy(charlie), pW, .25,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),aW, .25,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),gW, .25,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),eW, .25,{wineSeller(quality)})
. . .
All possible outcomes after buying from charlie have the same probability. This rule also generates
the probabilities of disjoint formulas:
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BC : E(buy(charlie), pW ∨aW, .50,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie), pW ∨gW, .50,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie), pW ∨ eW, .50,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),aW ∨gW, .50,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),aW ∨ eW, .50,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),gW ∨ eW, .50,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie), pW ∨aW ∨gW, .75,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie), pW ∨gW ∨ eW, .75,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie),aW ∨gW ∨ eW, .75,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : E(buy(charlie), pW ∨aW ∨gW ∨ eW,1,{wineSeller(quality)})
The previous E predicates are directly transformed to B predicates through the axiom IRB, which
uses a h function belonging to H1 (only images are taken into account). In BC, because of the as-
sumption that the quality and delivery time dimensions are stochastically independent, probabilistic
inference rules of the LBC theory are applied. For example, from B(buy(charlie), eW, .25,{wineSeller(quality)})
and B(buy(charlie), days(0,1), .2,{wineSeller(time)}) can be deduced
B(buy(charlie),eW ∧days(0,1), .05,{wineSeller(quality),wineSeller(time)})
where .05 is the product of .25 and .2. In particular, and for the interest of our example, the following
belief is also generated:
B(buy(charlie),hasWine∧ paid(400)∧ eW, .25,{wineSeller(quality),wineSeller(time)})
Bridge rules 1 and 2 are executed for each generic positive and negative desire respectively. For
instance, rule 1 is fired for the first desire as follows:
DC : (D+(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), .9)
BC : B(buy(charlie),hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW, .25,Q)
(D+buy(charlie)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ),g(.9, .25))
If we consider that g(p,q) = p ·q, the resulting grade of the positive concrete desire is .225. It indi-
cates that performing the action of buying from charlie to obtain an excellent wine and paying less
than 1350 has an expected level of satisfaction of .225. Of course, for the same desire bridge rule 1
can be executed several times because different actions can lead to the same desire. Negative desires
fire bridge rule 2 generating concrete negative desires. They indicate the expected level of disgust if
the action is executed.
These negative desires are used in bridge rule 3 to take into account possible counter-effects
of satisfying certain desire. Rule 3 is executed only one time for each positive concrete desire. For
example, considering the desire above:
DC : (D+buy(charlie)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), .225)
DC : (D−buy(charlie)days(11,∞), .08)
DC : (D−buy(charlie)days(6,10), .08)
DC : (D−buy(charlie)aW, .2)
DC : (D−buy(charlie)pW, .25)
PC : action(buy(charlie),budgetMore(400))
PC : budget(1100)→ budgetMore(400)
IC : (Ibuy(charlie)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), f (.225, .61))
In this case, notice that the expected level of satisfaction of achieving the desire by buying from
charlie is .225 but its counter-effects bring an expected level of disgust of .61. Taking f (δ+,δ−) =
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max(0, δ+− δ−), this intention has a grade of 0. Why would we perform an action if we expected
from it to obtain more disgust than benefit?.
If the intention had the maximum degree, bridge rule 4 would generate the corresponding action.
In our example, after calculation, the intentions with a grade higher than 0 result to be:
(Ibuy(charlie)hasWine, .14)
(Ibuy(bob)hasWine, .14)
(Ibuy(alice)hasWine.14)
As expected, since Repage does not have any information and our agent needs to buy wine, a random
choice can be made among these possibilities. Buying from debra is not considered because in rule
3 the precondition of having a budget greater than 1300 does not hold (see the action definition in the
planner context). Assuming that she picks (Ibuy(charlie),hasWine,.14), bridge rule 4 is fired executing
the action buy(charlie).
The result of this transaction fulfills the agent’s desires in terms of delivery time and quality. This
information is inserted into Repage by means of the bridge rule B. Repage evaluates the outcomes
and updates the values of image and reputation. In the next reasoning process, this information will
be introduced as beliefs by bridge rule AI and AR, as we have shown at the beginning of this case.
Continuing with our example, we suppose that charlie delivers the wine quite fast, in less than
one day, but the quality of the wine is not very good. This makes Repage update image predicates as
Img(charlie,wineSeller(quality), [.4, .4, .1, .1])
Img(charlie,wineSeller(time), [.45, .25, .1, .1, .1])
We recall here that w1, w2, . . . in the role wineSeller(quality) correspond to pW , aW ,. . . meanwhile
in the role wineSeller( time) they correspond to days(0,1), days(2,3), . . . respectively.
6.2.2 Receiving Reputation Information: case 2
After a while, our agent needs to buy more wine. She has exactly the same desires as before and
the same budget, so she is mainly interested in the quality of the wine rather than delivery time. But
this time, her image information about charlie has changed. Furthermore, we assume that she has
received several reputation communications, about both charlie and alice. This information makes
Repage generate the following reputation predicates:
Rep(charlie,wineSeller(quality), [.5, .3, .1, .1])
Rep(alice,wineSeller(quality), [.1, .2, .2, .4])
The reputation information regarding charlie coincides more or less with the image our agent has
about him. This is not the case with alice. Through bridge rule AR these predicates generate beliefs
into BC. For charlie:
RC : Rep(charlie,wineSeller(quality), [.5, .3, .1, .1])
BC : S(buy(charlie), pW, .5,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : S(buy(charlie),aW, .3,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : S(buy(charlie),gW, .1,{wineSeller(quality)})
BC : S(buy(charlie),eW, .1,{wineSeller(quality)})
Note that these beliefs refer to what others say, not what our agent really believes. Since our agent
only trusts herself, she does not take into account these predicates. In terms of the BC-logic it in-
dicates that there is no relationship between operator S and operator Bi so far. This situation is also
common: we can accept that a given person has a bad reputation, that most people say this, even
when we believe the opposite [9].
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Under these conditions, the reasoning process is similar to the previous case. This time though,
charlie is no longer a possible choice, since the last experience with him was bad regarding the
quality of the wine. Bridge rule 3 generates the intention to buy from charlie with a very low grade,
in fact zero, since it is likely a poor or average wine would be delivered. In this case, the generated
intentions are
(Ibuy(bob)hasWine, .14)
(Ibuy(alice)hasWine, .14)
Our agent chooses alice. This time we suppose the result is in tune with the expectations of our
agent; she obtains a good wine, even though the delivery time is not very fast. Repage updates image
predicates regarding alice as follows:
Img(alice,wineSeller(quality), [0,0, .15, .85])
Img(alice,wineSeller(time), [0,0,0, .1, .9])
6.2.3 Keeping the same desires: case 3
Maintaining the exact same desires as case 1 and 2, the next time that our agent wants to buy wine,
she has the following intentions whose grade is higher than 0:
(IbuyWine(bob)hasWine, .14),
(IbuyWine(alice)hasWine, .35)
(IbuyWine(alice)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), .365)
Since alice provided wine that was mostly excellent, and this is the main concern of our agent, she
chooses again to buy from alice, but to satisfy the desire hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW . The option
to buy from bob appears due to the uncertainty around his performance. We suppose that the resulting
transaction confirms the same results as the previous case: an excellent wine but a long delivery time.
6.2.4 Changing Desires: case 4
This time our agent accepts the suddenly request to host a big birthday banquet that will take place
in less than 12 days. Her cellar is not prepared for this event, so, she needs to order more wine. In
this situation, her desires are different, since delivery time is now a key issue while the quality of the
wine drops in importance:
(D+hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧days(0,1), .9)
(D+hasWine∧ paidLess(800)∧days(2,3), .7)
(D−pW, .2)
(D−aW, .2)
(D−days(11,∞), .8)
(D−days(6,10), .7)
Thanks to her previous interactions with the providers our agent already has some information about
their performance. In this case, the only intention with a degree higher that 0 is
(IbuyWine(charlie)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧days(0,1)), .095)
She picks charlie, and the results are like the first time she bought from him in case 1: a short delivery
time but a low quality.
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6.2.5 Using Reputation Information: case 5
Several weeks after the successful banquet, our agent recuperates her initial desires and needs to order
wine again. During this time she has heard about both bob and debra’s reputations which indicates
that both offer excellent wines and that furthermore debra is capable to deliver the order in a day.
This is not the case with bob:
Rep(bob,wineSeller(quality), [0,0, .05, .95])
Rep(bob,wineSeller(time), [.1, .2, .3, .3, .1])
Rep(debra,wineSeller(quality), [0,0,0,1])
Rep(debra,wineSeller(time), [1,0,0,0,0])
This information is introduced through rule AR as S predicates. Unfortunately for our agent, alice
notifies that she will not be available this time because she will be on holidays. Because of that, and
because the reputation information she received in case 2 was in concordance with what she really
believed, our agent starts trusting what others gossip. In this new scenario, the IRB axiom is set to
use a h function belonging toH2 (only reputation is taken into acount). Thus, the axiom IRB states
the following:
∀axp1p2r(I(a,x, p1,r)∧S(a,x, p2,r))→ B(a,x, p2,r)
It means that reputation predicates from Repage, once they have been inserted into the BC-
context as S predicates, they become belief predicates. For instance, regarding bob in the role of
wineSeller(quality), rule AR generates, among others, the following predicate: S(buy(bob), eW, .95,
{wineSeller(quality)}), meaning that people is gossiping that with is a probability of .95, the wine
will be excellent when buying from bob. Since our agent believes what it gossiped due to axiom IRB,
it can be deduced that B(buy(bob), eW, .95, {wineSeller(quality)}). In this case, the only non-zero
graded intention generated is
(Ibuy(bob)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), .565)
From the activation of bridge rule 3 as follows:
DC : (D+buy(bob)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), .0.855)
DC : (D−buy(bob)days(11,∞), .08)
DC : (D−buy(charlie)days(6,10), .21)
PC : action(buy(bob),budgetMore(900))
PC : budget(1100)→ budgetMore(900)
IC : (Ibuy(bob)(hasWine∧ paidLess(1350)∧ eW ), f (.855, .29))
We suppose in this situation that the results are not as the agent expects, obtaining an average
wine. Thus, Repage image predicates are updated as:
Img(bob,wineSeller(quality), [.3, .4, .2, .1])
Img(bob,wineSeller(time), [.1, .2, .3, .3, .1])
6.2.6 Image and Reputation Interference: case 6
Note that in the previous situation, the image about bob in the role wineSeller(quality) contradicts
bob’s reputation in the same role. This has already happened in case 2 with alice, but axiom IRB
was only taking into account image information. in this new case, we assume that the IRB uses a
h function from the classH4, where both image and reputation are taken into account but image is
more important. As a matter of example, we set function h as
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h(pE , pS) =
7 · pE +3 · pS
10
We show how the reasoning process proceeds. Regarding the role wineSeller(quality), through
bridge rule AI the following E predicates are generated into the belief context:
E(buy(bob), pW,0.3,{wineSeller(quality)})
E(buy(bob),aW,0.4,{wineSeller(quality)})
E(buy(bob),gW,0.2,{wineSeller(quality)})
E(buy(bob),eW,0.1,{wineSeller(quality)})
. . .
and through bridge rule AR the following:
S(buy(bob), pW,0,{wineSeller(quality)})
S(buy(bob),aW,0,{wineSeller(quality)})
S(buy(bob),gW,0.05,{wineSeller(quality)})
S(buy(bob),eW,0.95,{wineSeller(quality)})
. . .
Then, the presence of axiom IRB with the h function defined above combines both predicates
generating a new probability distribution. In this case:
B(buy(bob), pW,0.21,{wineSeller(quality)})
B(buy(bob),aW,0.28,{wineSeller(quality)})
B(buy(bob),gW,0.155,{wineSeller(quality)})
B(buy(bob),eW,0.355,{wineSeller(quality)})
. . .
In this way we preserve the properties of probability distributions, reflecting in the resulting
beliefs a combination of the both source of information: image and reputation from Repage.
Turning again to the example above, note that the resulting beliefs for bob presents a distribution
that model an almost uncertain distribution, here values are close to 0.25. This make sense since
image and reputation information regarding bobwhere quite contradictory. In this situation, our agent
picks alice.
6.2.7 Increasing the budget: case 7
To conclude, we want to show the effect of a simple environment change. In this case, our agent
decides to increase the wine budget to 2000. With exactly the same desires and the same reputation
and image information as before, the reasoning process generates the maximum intention to buy from
debra. This provider was always filtered out at bridge rule 3 because the precondition of buying from
debra (to have more than 1300) was never fulfilled. Thus, the intention to buy from debra is only
slightly higher than buying from alice.
6.3 Implementation Details
The scenario and each one of the situations have been implemented in Prolog5. An implementation
of logical systems usually entails the simplification or limitation of some aspects of the logic. In our
5 The source code can be download at http://www.iiia.csic.es/∼ipinyol/sourceJAAMAS09.zip.
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Fig. 4 The choices of the agent throughout the situations explained in this section
case, we assume that each logical formula is expressed as a horn clause and that modal operators
are first-order predicates. Also, we do not accept logically omniscient agents that use a forward-
reasoning engine, even when some implementations of multi-context systems use this approach [44].
Instead, we take advantage of the backward-reasoning engine of Prolog.
Note that the multi-context system specification of our BDI agent models an agent whose purpose
is to execute a single action. This action is generated through rule 4 by choosing the intention of
maximum grade. For this choice the agent must generate all possible intentions, which are created
through rule 3 from desires, and so on. This schema follows a backward-reasoning algorithm that can
be implemented in Prolog.
Thus, considering predefined knowledge as Prolog predicates, and inference rules and bridge
rules as Prolog rules, the agent’s reasoning can be started by asking Prolog to satisfy the predicate
does(A). While this is an oversimplification of what should be understood as multi-context systems,
for simple examples the results are coherent and useful. We plan to study implementation issues in
the future, an the effects of the simplifications in the desirable properties of the system.
7 Related Work
To finish the paper we want to put our model in contrast with some of the current state-of-the-art
reputation and trust models. Hence, in this section we compare our BDI+Repage model with other
existing models by defining four dimensions of analysis that have not been explicitly tackled in the
most popular reviews. In the review, we only explore distributed models, those that consider trust or
reputation a subjective information managed by each individual agent.
7.1 Trust Dimension
Even when we have not explicitly defined a trust model, from a cognitive point of view, our BDI+Repage
architecture can be considered a trust model, in the sense that there is a reasoning path that leads to a
decision to rely in someone. We do not want to differentiate between models classified as trust and
others as reputation. We strongly believe that the distinction between both kinds of models does not
rely on a clear consensus in the community. For instance, the type dimension that Sabater provides in
his classification is not based on any objective fact, but on what the authors of the models claim [41].
On the contrary, when facing these concepts from a more cognitive perspective, the distinction
becomes clearer. From the concept of social trust [8], occurrent and dispositional trust [22,16] and
pragmatic-strategic decisions pointed out by Conte and Paolucci in [9], trust implies a decision. Trust
can be seen as a process of practical reasoning that leads to the decision to interact with somebody.
Regarding this aspect, some models provide evaluations, rates, scores etc. for each agent to help the
decision maker with a final decision. Instead, others specify how the actual decision should be made.
From our point of view, only the latter cases can be considered trust models. We recall here that in
this case, the decisions are also pragmatic-strategic, in the sense described in [9].
Table 2 summarizes the models that from our definition should be considered trust models. We
mark them with ’X’. For instance, the model defined by Marsh [29] is a trust model because it indi-
cates exactly to whom to interact with. The final decision is made through a well-defined threshold.
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Another example is the model defined by Sen & Sajja [46]. Even when this model is usually consid-
ered a reputation model, the fact is that it defines a decision making process that identifies to whom
to interact with, and then, fits in our definition of trust.
Models marked with ’−’ are those that we do not consider trust models. They calculate mea-
sures or evaluations to help a decision making process. For instance, the AFRAS model [4,3] gives
evaluations in terms of fuzzy sets, and the shape of these fuzzy numbers also determines a reliabil-
ity measure. However, there is no mechanism that tells the agent how to use such evaluations. This
situation is similar as in the Repage model. As explained before the model only gives support to the
creation of image or reputation predicates, not how such information is combined.
Finally, we use the mark ∼ to indicate that the model does not give an explicit decision mecha-
nism, but that it is rather dependent on the current desires of the agent. For instance, the Regret model
[38] provides for each agent and context a trust value, together with a reliability measure. The trust
value is calculated through aggregation of the information from several sources. One of the sources is
defined by an ontology, which already determines which information is considered more important6.
Hence, the goals of the agent are somehow codified in this ontology, and the final trust value obtained
is an indicator of which possible target agent matches better with the desires of the agent. However,
since it offers a reliability measure the decision is not yet possible. For instance, let us assume that
agent a has a trust value of 0.6 with a reliability of 1. On the other hand, another agent b has a trust
value of 0.8 with a reliability of 0.4. Which is the best option? It still requires a decision making
process. However, it is clear that with similar reliability measures, the agent with highest trust value
is the chosen one. FIRE model [23] shows a similar situation.
7.2 Cognitive Dimension
Although this dimension has already appeared in other surveys, the provided definitions are quite
vague. In this dimension we differentiate models that have clear representations of trust, reputation,
image etc. in terms of cognitive elements such as beliefs, goals, desires, intentions, etc. From our per-
spective, models that achieve such representation explicitly describe the epistemic and motivational
attitudes that are necessary for the agents to have trust or to hold social evaluations. In this sense, in
models that achieve a cognitive representation, final values of trust and reputation are as important as
the structure that supports them. These models are usually very clear at the conceptual level, but lack
in computational aspects.
Often, models that are not endowed with this property consider the model as a black box that
receives inputs and issues trust and reputation values. Because of that, the internal calculation process
cannot be considered by the agent, only the final values. Moreover, the integration with the other
elements of the agent remains unclear because motivational attitudes are assumed or mix with the
calculus. However, their computational aspects are usually quite well defined.
In table 2 we show the summary of the reviewed models against this dimension. We marked with
’X’ the ones with such property, and ’−’ the lack of it. We mark the Repage model with ’∼’ because
the internal structure is based on predicates that have associated cognitive notions, but it does not have
an explicit representation of them. In fact, Repage integrates into first-order like predicates, mixing
also epistemic and motivational attitudes. The model presented in this paper, the BDI+Repage model
makes explicit these missing cognitive components.
7.3 Procedural dimension
Often, models offer a nice way to represent and deal with trust and reputation, but there is no ex-
planations on how they are archive. This is quite common in cognitive models, which focus on the
6 For instance, to calculate the trust of agents as sellers, the ontology can define that this is evaluated through the
price in an 80% and through the delivery time in a 20%
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Model Trust Cognitive Procedural Generality
Abdul-Rahman et al. − − ∼ −
AFRAS − − X X
Castelfranchi et al. X X − X
FIRE ∼ − X X
ForTrust X X − X
Marsh X − ∼ X
LIAR X − X −
Regret ∼ − X X
Repage − ∼ X X
Schillo et al. − − X X
Sen & Sajja X − X −
Yu & Singh X − X −
BDI+Repage X X X X
Table 2 Computational Models against our classification dimensions.
internal components of trust and reputation, on a descriptive dimension, but not how such compo-
nents are built. However, some non-cognitive models do not give explicit details on the calculus of
their evaluations. We must recall here that we focus on the epistemic decisions, not on the creation
and combination of motivational attitudes (goal-based).
The model introduced by Castelfranchi and Falcone [8] regarding social trust does not give de-
tails on how the beliefs are created. ForTrust model [22,16] redefines the notion of social trust and
introduces cognitive reputation but still epistemic decisions remain unclear. On the contrary, models
like AFRAS [4,3] and Regret [39,41] describe until the last detail how evaluations are created and
how they are aggregated.
We mark Marsh [29] and Abdul-Rahman et al. [1] models with ’∼’ to indicate that in general
they provide all the calculations, but left some initial values. For instance, in the former, the model
does not indicate how direct interactions are evaluated. The author indicates that this is left open and
dependent of the context (and we totally agree with it). The same happens with the latter model.
7.4 Generality dimension
The last dimension we want to analyze refers to the generality of the model. In this dimension we
want to classify the models that have a general purpose ’X’ versus the ones that focus on very
particular scenarios ’−’. For instance, the model by Abdul-Rahman et al. [1] is a non-general model
that focuses on the trust on the information provided by witness agents. The same happens with the
model by Yu & Singh [48], which is designed for agents participating in a very structured peer-to-
peer network, where evaluations are only done in terms of quality of services. Obviously, the models
that have such specification obtain good results and very acceptable computational complexities.
On the contrary, models built for general purposes can be adapted to multiple scenarios and are
perfect then for general agents architectures. Regret [38,41] and BDI+Repage model [33] are good
examples of such models. Again, table 2 summarizes in the last column this property against the
surveyed models.
7.5 Brief Explanation of the Models
7.5.1 A-Rahman and Hailes
This model [1] uses the term trust, and its main characteristic relays on that evaluations are repre-
sented with a discrete set of four elements. The model is fed by two sources: direct experiences and
third party communications of direct experiences. The representation of the evaluations is done in
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terms of the discrete set {vt (very trustworthy), t (trustworthy), u (untrustworthy), vu (very untrust-
worthy)}. Then, for each agent and context the system keeps a tuple with the number of past own
experiences or communicated experiences in each category. For instance, agent A may have a tuple
of agent B as a seller like (0,0,2,3), meaning that agent A has received or experienced 2 results as
untrustworthiness and 3 as very untrustworthiness. Finally the trust value is computed taking the
maximum of the tuple values. In our example for agent A, agent B as a seller would be very untrust-
worthy. In case of tie between vt and t and between u and vu the system gives the valuesU+ (mostly
trustworthy) andU− (mostly untrustworthy) respectively. In any other tie case the system returnsU0
(neutral).
7.5.2 AFRAS
The model presented by Carbo et al. [4] uses fuzzy sets to represent reputation values. The idea is
that the latest interaction that an agent has with a partner, that is also valued as a fuzzy set, updates
the old fuzzy set reputation value through a weighted aggregation. To calculate the weights, they
introduce the remembrance for memory, a factor that allows the agent to give more weight to the
latest interaction or to the old reputation value. The novelty of this approach relies on the reliability
of the reputation value, since it is intrinsically represented in the fuzzy set. So, a wide fuzzy set
for a reputation value indicates a high level of uncertainty, meanwhile narrow ones, implies a more
reliability.
The model also deals with the recommendations sent by other members of the society. The rec-
ommendations are aggregated together with the direct interactions. The level of reliability of this
witness information will depend on the good or bad reputation of the senders. In this case then, rec-
ommendations from a very well reputed sender could have the same weight than direct interactions.
7.5.3 Castelfranchi & Falcone
Castelfranchi & Falcone in [8] define trust as a mental state composed of a set of goals and beliefs
and strongly related to the notion of delegation. In a more formal way, let i, j be two agents, the
cognitive components that make i trusts j regarding the goal g are the following [8]7:
– Goal Seeking: i has the goal g.
– Competence Belief: i believes that j is capable of obtaining g from a set of actions (summarized
in the action α)
– Disposition Belief: i believes that j will actually perform α to obtain g. This belief makes agents
predictable.
– Dependence Belief: i believes that she needs/depends on j to perform the task.
Competence and disposition beliefs, together with the goal are the core trust. They model the
ability and willingness of the agent j to achieve g. They are evaluative beliefs and are constituents
of the image and reputation of j in the sense described at the beginning in the previous chapter. This
property was already mention in [30], where the authors exemplify which kinds of beliefs compose
evaluations, and the capabilities that cognitive agents must achieve in order to be evaluators.
7.5.4 ForTrust
The ForTrust model presented in [22] refine the notion of social trust by differentiating occurrent
from dispositional trust. The former is understood as the trust on other agents to act here and now, and
coincide with the core trust definition given by Castelfranchi and Falcone. In contrast, dispositional
7 The authors describe other beliefs and goals that are part of the trust mental state, like fulfillment belief or wishes.
However, for the sake of clarity we obviate them because they are a direct cause of the beliefs shown in the list.
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trust denotes the disposition of the trustee to perform an action in order to obtain a potential goal
when some conditions hold [22].
From amore technical perspective the authors define occurrent trust with the predicateOccTrust(i, j,α,ϕ),
indicating that i trusts j here and now to perform action α to obtain goal ϕ . As in the definition of core
trust from Castelfranchi and Falcone [8], the components embrace an occurrent goal, an occurrent
capability belief, an occurrent power belief and an occurrent intention belief. More formally:
OccTrust(i, j,α,ϕ) =de f OccGoali(ϕ)∧
Belie fi(OccCap( j,α))∧
Belie fi(OccPower( j,α,ϕ))∧
Belie fi(OccIntends( j,α))
The beliefs on the occurrent capability and occurrent power correspond to the competence beliefs,
while occurrent intention to the disposition belief. Regarding dispositional trust, the background
components are the same but we move from occurrent goals to potential goals, and from occurrent
beliefs to potential beliefs. Following [22], dispositional trust is defined as follows:
DispTrust(i, j,α,ϕ) =de f PotGoali(ϕ)∧
Belie fi(CondCap( j,α))∧
Belie fi(CondPower( j,α,ϕ))∧
Belie fi(CondIntends( j,α))
7.5.5 ReGreT
The ReGreT system presented by Sabater [38] is maybe one of the most complete reputation and
trust models, since it takes into account several advantages of all the models presented so far.
ReGreT uses direct experiences, third party information and social structures to calculate trust,
reputation and levels of credibility. In this model, trust is a function of direct trust, only calculated
through direct experiences, and reputation. The incorporated reputation model uses transmitted in-
formation, social networks analysis, system reputation and prejudices (to infer reputation values of
unknown agents from their belonging group). It also incorporates a credibility module to evaluate the
truthfulness of witness information, that of course, takes into account the reputation and trust of the
information provider. It provides reliability measures for trust, reputation and credibility values.
Finally, an important aspect of this model is the consideration for an ontological dimension.
They defined the trust of agent a on b towards certain context ϕ as Ta→bϕ . The situation ϕ is totally
contextualized, and may depend on other elements. To describe the relationships of contextualized
environment, it is assumed an ontology that describes this knowledge, that could be seen as the
current preferred desires or goals of the agent.
7.5.6 FIRE
The FIRE model introduced by Huynh et al. [23] incorporates similar elements than Regret. It com-
putes as well a trust value for each agent and a reliability measure. It uses direct trust computed
though direct experiences (extracted from Regret as the same authors claim), witness information
(similar to Regret) and certified reputation. The last one is a completely new component. Certified
reputations are ratings presented by the rated agent about itself which have been obtained from its
partners in past interactions[23]. The authors argue that this could be seen as the recommendation
letters or references when applying for a job position.
The model uses role-based trust to determine the elements that contribute to the calculation of
trust. This component is similar to the ontology dimension of Regret. Therefore, they can be seen as
the desires (or goals) of the agent.
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7.5.7 Marsh
This model [29], one of the first that appeared in literature, talks explicitly about trust, and only takes
into account direct experiences. It defines three kinds of trust.
– Basic Trust: T tx represents the trust disposition of agent x at time t.
– General Trust: Tx(y)t represents the general trust that agent x has on y at time t without specify-
ing any situation.
– Situational Trust: Tx(y,α)t represents the trust of agent x on the target agent y in the situation
α . Marsh defines a basic formula to calculate it:
Tx(y,α)t =Ux(α)t · Ix(α)t ·Tx(y)t (1)
whereUx(α)t is the utility that agent x gains from situation α , Ix(α)t is the importance for agent
x in the situation α , and Tx(y)t is the estimation of general trust after taking into account all
information related to Tx(y)t . The author proposes three ways to calculate this estimation: the
mean, the maximum and the minimum of all past experiences.
7.5.8 Yu and Singh
In this model [47], the result of direct interactions is stored as what the authors call quality of service
(-QoS-). Agents only keep the most recent interactions, and each agent defines a threshold for each
partner over which she is classified as a trustworthy agent.
Also, the model incorporates for each agent a TrustNet structure, in a similar way as Schillo
et al. [45] and Histos [49]. The difference is that agents being queried can refer to other agents.
The initial agent will take into account the information only if the refereed agents are not too far in
the social tree. The model uses Dempster Shafer evidence theory to aggregate the information from
different source agents.
7.5.9 LIAR
The LIAR model presented by Muller & Vercouter [31] focuses on the detection of fraud and repu-
tation management in the communications. The authors use a normative language to formalize pro-
hibited situations in terms of the information sent by the agents and the commitments that they set.
Through this, the model defines a procedure capable to detect lies.
The model mainly uses two different kinds of reputation: Direct Experience-Based Reputation
and Observation-Based Reputation. With this information agents can decide whether to trust or dis-
trust the information sent by a given source agent. The authors detail the decision making process
for the trust decision, and thus, from our perspective, it becomes a trust model. The model is framed
in peer-to-peer networks.
7.5.10 Schillo et al.
The model presented by Schillo et al. [45] was designed for societies or environments where the
evaluation of interactions between agents has a boolean nature, for instance, good or bad. For this
reason it works perfectly in scenarios like the prisoners dilemma. The idea is that the result of an
interaction computes the honesty of the partner by checking what she claimed and what she finally
did. Taking into account all the results in the interactions, the model calculates the probability on
the honesty in the next interaction, by simply dividing the number of interactions where the agent
was honest by the total number of interactions. Then, let A, B be agents, where A has observed B
being honest h times on a total of n interactions, the probability for A that B will be honest the next
interaction is calculated by T (A,B) = hn .
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This naive idea is complemented with a very interesting source of information. They incorporate a
social network, a TrustNet data structure, for each agent. The idea is that agents can query other agents
that have met before. This witness information will be a set of interaction results, not a summary of
them, that agents can incorporate to their probability calculus.
7.5.11 Sen and Sajja
In the model presented by Sen and Sajja [46] the authors explicitly talk about reputation. The model
considers two kinds of direct experience: direct interaction and direct observation. The idea is that
only direct interactions give an exact perception of the performance of the agents. The authors sup-
pose that observations are noisy, and that may differ from reality. Due to this difference, the impact
than direct interactions have on the updating rule of reputation values is much higher that direct obser-
vations. They represent the reputation values as real numbers in the interval [0,1] where 0 represents
the worst reputation and 1 the best one, in a linear function.
In addition, in their model agents can query other agents about the performance of other partners,
being the answer always a boolean, good or bad. From this witness information, agents calculate the
number of positive and negative answers received about the same partner.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a possible integration of a cognitive reputation model, Repage, in a
BDI agent architecture. The agent has been specified using multi-context systems, where each atti-
tude has been represented as a context. We used BC-logic, a hierarchical first-oder logic to represent
the beliefs of the agent, allowing probabilistic reasoning. In particular we show how Repage social
evaluations, image and reputation, are translated into probabilistic formulas written in BC-logic, and
under which conditions image and reputation information influence each other. Regarding this issue,
we have introduced several trust axioms regarding agents as information sources. The full BDI rea-
soning process is done by also allowing graded desires and graded intentions, and stating appropriate
bridge rules to relate them.
From the example it should be clear that on one hand epistemic decisions play a crucial role in
the pragmatic-strategic decisions of the agent, and that a formal model for its integration improves
the conceptualization of the reasoning process. On the other hand, the consequences of pragmatic-
strategic decisions may effect the epistemic decisions. Even when in this work we have used Repage
model, we took it as a paradigmatic example of a cognitive reputation model. Other models with
similar (or simplified) notions could be also used in the BDI framework.
The classification dimensions that we provide in the relate work section enhance the contribution
of this paper. Nevertheless, we want to point out several considerations:
1. Even when we are placing the BDI+Repage model as a trust model, we want to clarify that the
architecture is more general. We do not explicitly define trust, but it emerges from a set of beliefs,
desires and intentions when a decision is made and such decision involves an action to interact
with another agent.
2. Also, when trust emerges from the reasoning, it can be completely defined in terms of a mental
state composed of beliefs, desires and intentions. Hence, we classify it as a cognitive model.
When a decision is made and such decision involes an interaction with another agent, the mental
state can be seen as trust, in the sense described by Castelfranchi and Falcone [8] and Herzig et
al. [22].
3. Moreover, bootstrapping is possible, becoming, as far as we know, the only trust model that has
a cognitive representation and at the same time, an analytical formulation to update and calculate
the cognitive components of trust.
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4. Finally, the model has a general purpose. It is not attached to any underlying network typology
nor ontology, and thus, it could and should be adapted to the peculiarities of the environments,
although we believe that this knowledge could be codified as beliefs.
In the future we are interested in studying the resolution of cognitive dissonances, situations
in which the agent cannot decide which action to perform due to contradictory information. This
research direction is somehow related to argumentation issues. Parsons et al. in [32] use a multi-
context BDI agent to build an argumentation framework that we could adapt in our model. Also,
work related to coherence analysis can be used for such purpose. For instance, in the work [24], a
deductive coherence framework is formalized in the basis of a BDI multi-context agent, and it could
be used to solve these problems.
Another important part of this research line involves the empirical study of certain properties
regarding image and reputation through simulations, and therefore implementation of the model using
a logic-based multiagent platform, like JASON[2]. One point that we are specially interested is in the
study on how graded trust conditions affect the overall performance of societies, and therefore, how
the relation between image and reputation is relevant in determining the dynamics of the society.
Regarding this issue, we are implementation a simple scenario using JASON where a simplified
version of our BDI model is introduced. We plan to exhaustively study the perfomance of such
simulation platform.
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A Internals of Repage
In the Repage architecture we find three main elements, a memory, a set of detectors and the analyzer
(see figure 5). In the memory, predicates are conceptually organized in levels of abstraction and inter-
connected. Each predicate that belongs to one of the main types (image, reputation, shared voice,
shared evaluation, valued communication and outcome) contains an evaluation that refers to a certain
agent in a specific role. We maintain the value associated to a predicate as a tuple of n positive
values (summing to one), that we call weights, plus a strength value: {w1, ..,wn,s}. Originally, only
five values where considered, each one associated with a linguistic label: Very Bad (VB), Bad (B),
Neutral (N), Good (G) and Very Good (VG).
The network of dependences specifies which predicates contribute to the values of others. Each
predicate (except those at the bottom level) has a set of antecedents and at the same time contributes to
the calculation of other predicates. The detectors, inference units specialized in each particular kind
of predicate, receive notifications from predicates that have changed or that appear in the system, like
new communications or new fulfillments, and use the dependences to recalculate the new values and
to populate the memory with new predicates. The aggregation of evaluations is done with a weighted
product (see [43] for a short discussion and [19] and [42] for details about the aggregation operation).
Let m be the number of evaluations w j to aggregate, indicating their weight by w ji . The aggregated
evaluation w is calculated as follows:
∀i : 0≤ i≤ n−1 : wi =
∏mj=1w
j
i
∑n−1i=0 ∏
m
j=1w
j
i
(2)
Furthermore, each predicate has associated a strength that is function of its antecedents and of the
intrinsic properties of each kind of predicate. As a general rule, predicates that resume or aggregate a
bigger number of predicates will hold a higher strength. However, strength is closely related to bias
factors, rules that for instance, give more importance to direct experiences that indirect experiences,
and that may come from sociology or psychology theories, or from simple common sense.
At the first level of the Repage memory we find a set of predicates not evaluated yet by the
system.
– Contracts: agreements of the future interaction between two agents. For instance, in an e-Commerce
environment, an agent may expect the maximum quality of a product that for sure the seller is
saying will offer.
– Fulfillment: the result of the interaction. In the same e-Commerce example, the fulfillment would
be the real quality of the product the agent got.
– Communications: Information that other agents may communicate about others’ evaluations.
These communications may be related to three different aspects: the image that the informer has
about a target, the image that according to the informer a third party agent has, and the reputation
that the informer has about the target.
In level two we have two kind of predicates:
– Valued communication: The subjective evaluation of the communication received that takes into
account, for instance the image the agent may have of the informer as informant. Communica-
tions from agents whose credibility in terms of image or may be reputation are low, will not be
considered as strongly as the ones coming from well reputed informers.
– Outcome: The agent’s subjective evaluation of the direct interaction. From a fulfillment and a
contract a detector builds up an outcome predicate that evaluates the particular transaction.
39
Fig. 5 The Repage Architecture.
In the third level we find two predicates that are only fed by valued communications. On one hand,
a shared voice will hold the information received about the same target and same role coming from
communicated reputations. On the other hand, shared evaluation is the equivalent for communicated
images and third party images.
Shared voice predicates will generate candidate reputation, and share evaluations together with
outcomes, candidate image. In this fourth level candidate reputation and candidate images aren’t
strong enough to become a full reputation and image respectively. New communications and new
direct interactions will contribute at this level to enrich these predicates and therefore “jump” to
images and reputations. For details on the remaining elements we refer to [43].
